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GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND
COMPETITION LAW: SOME
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
DAVID J. GERBER*
In this Symposium we view global technological integration from
two public policy vantage points. One, the international intellectual
property rights regime, is concerned with creating and protecting
rights and the incentives associated with them. The other, competi-
tion law, seeks to protect the process of competition from restraints.
If the normative framework for international trade and investment is
to be coherent, these two legal projects should be coordinated; each
should operate so as to support-or at least not interfere with-the
other's effectiveness. Yet the current state of our knowledge and
thinking about these issues does not allow us to assess with any confi-
dence how the international expansion of property rights may affect
competition on the international level.
Our central objective here is to contribute to fashioning useful
and analytically sound perspectives on the intersection of these two
legal regimes, and in these introductory comments I sketch some fac-
tors that might be considered in fashioning a competition law perspec-
tive on the evolving intellectual property rights system. Developing
such a perspective means posing questions that are seldom posed:
How should we view competition law in the international context? Is
there a distinctly identifiable "process" of competition on the interna-
tional level? If so, to what extent can we use law to protect such a
process? Assuming we can, should we? The new international intel-
lectual property rights regime is likely to influence the process of in-
ternational competition in ways that are as yet only dimly perceived,
and thus we need to develop a perspective from which these effects
can be analyzed and policy responses can be developed.
I will look at three basic components of such a perspective. First,
how do we assess harm to competition? If we are to consider using
law to protect competition, we need to be confident of our percep-
tions of the competitive process and of harms to that process. Second,
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how do we assess the need for an international response? Presuma-
bly, we only want to respond to harms if we are convinced that those
harms justify a response. And, third, how do we fashion appropriate
international responses?
I. IDENTIFYING HARM ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
The first of these issues is central to the entire project. If we are
to use law to protect competition, we need a relatively clear concep-
tion of the process that we are seeking to protect and what constitutes
harm to that process. Only if the new intellectual property regime
poses significant threats to such a process should we consider norma-
tive responses to protect that process.
How then should we conceive of the process of competition on
the international level? Curiously, this presumably fundamental ques-
tion is seldom posed. The implicit assumption seems to be that we can
look at harm to competition on the international level the same we
look at it on the domestic level. This assumption may help explain
why these basic issues are seldom addressed: If we can merely use
domestic perspectives on the international level, why bother to fash-
ion an international perspective?
But surely this assumption-this leap from a national to an inter-
national perspective-deserves examination. There are at least two
major concerns. The first is "Who is 'we"'? Existing competition law
systems differ significantly in their conceptions of the process of com-
petition and of harms to that process. United States antitrust law
thinking, for example, differs in many important respects from that in
other competition law systems. The short-run efficiency model that is
currently fashionable in the United States often operates according to
assumptions and values that are quite different from those in Europe
or Japan, where the analytical time-frame is longer and other values
tend to play a greater role. As a consequence, we have different
"we's," and to the extent that we do, the assumption that we can use
domestic conceptions on the international level is a recipe for conflict,
misunderstanding, and ineffectiveness.
Even if there was only one "we," however, there would be no
justification for assuming that domestic assumptions and analyses are
appropriate for use on the international level. National perspectives
have been developed in the context of individual national markets and
in response to domestic concerns and interests. The international con-
text obviously differs greatly from that of a single national market,
[Vol. 72:357
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
and many issues and interests that are relevant to protecting competi-
tion on the international level do not operate on the domestic level.
National perspectives may, therefore, fail to take into account factors
that affect transnational competition but do not play a role on the
domestic level. Accordingly, to use such a perspective as the basis for
normative responses on the international level may cause unforeseen
consequences that are not likely to be positive.
What is required, therefore, is a conception of the process of in-
ternational competition that reflects such factors and that thus can
serve as the conceptual basis for assessing threats to competition on
the international level. The starting point for developing such a con-
ception is likely to be the same as on the domestic level-i.e., the pro-
cess of economic competition as depicted by economic theory. The
core concept is that each business unit in a given market is free to try
to maximize its own interests and enjoys opportunities to do so which
are approximately the same as those of other participants on that
market.
The process of competition on the international level has, how-
ever, additional dimensions that are not addressed by this discourse.
Competition there necessarily occurs across the boundaries of nation-
states rather than within a single market, and the factors conditioning
competitive freedom and opportunity often vary significantly as one
crosses those boundaries. Despite frequent references to the "global
market place," national-and occasionally, regional-boundaries con-
tinue to be a defining feature of transnational business operations.
For these purposes national boundaries have both static and dy-
namic aspects. The static aspect refers to those obstacles to the flow
of, inter alia, goods, persons, and capital that are created by the very
existence of nation-states. The borders of states create costs of many
kinds, including, for example, the need to comply with import and ex-
port formalities, registration requirements, and the knowledge and
compliance costs of operating in different legal and regulatory envi-
ronments. The effect of these borders is static in the sense that it does
not imply the manipulation of these boundaries by governments for
political or other purposes.
The dynamic aspect of these borders refers, in contrast, to the
capacity of states to manipulate flows across their borders of goods,
capital, and persons. Governments have authority to control such
movements, and they often use that authority in pursuing their own
interests. They may raise or lower tariffs, impose or change import or
1996]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
export quotas, or alter technical or other requirements in ways
designed to affect the costs of nondomestic products, services, or
capital.
These aspects of national borders mean that the existence and
conduct of governments are an integral part of the competitive pro-
cess on the international level. No image of that process can be con-
vincing or effective unless it depicts the role of governments in that
process. The challenge then is to develop a convincing competition
law perspective that includes reference to the impact of governments
on the structuring of transnational markets and can thus serve as the
basis for normative claims.
II. TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE?
Assuming that we develop a coherent and convincing conception
of the process of competition at the international level and thus a ba-
sis for evaluating harm to that process, how do we assess the potential
for using international legal tools to respond to these harms? What, if
anything, can and should be done at the international level?
A. The Capacity to Respond: Can Anything be Done?
One obstacle to evaluating the capacity to respond is the futility
assumption-i.e., the assumption (only sometimes articulated) that no
international response will be effective and that it is therefore futile to
consider such responses. This assumption is particularly prevalent in
talking about the use of law in two spheres of social life-the interna-
tional and the technological. In both areas one often hears comments
such as the following: "We do not know enough about what happens
here. The process of change is too fast, too powerful, too .... We do
not have enough information, and, therefore, we cannot do anything."
Since our concerns here involve both technology and international is-
sues, the futility assumption is likely to be a significant factor in con-
sidering international responses.
While skepticism and caution are certainly called for in consider-
ing any use of prescriptive authority, especially in areas where there
has been little experience, the futility assumption is not. Particularly
during the last decade, experience with domestic competition laws has
expanded dramatically in many parts of the world. We also have ac-
quired significant international experience in using tools of interna-
tional law to address economic problems generally (e.g., the GATT
Tokyo and Uruguay rounds), and this experience may be useful in
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developing strategies for protecting international competition. Fi-
nally, a normative and institutional "infrastructure" has been cre-
ated-from cooperation agreements between governments to
international institutions such as the newly-created World Trade Or-
ganization ("WTO")-that makes possible normative initiatives that
would be different or impossible to implement without such struc-
tures. We are in a position, therefore, to move beyond the futility
assumption to careful examination of potential responsive strategies.
Whether these tools can be effectively mobilized to protect the
process of competition on an international level will depend on a vari-
ety of factors that will need to be assessed. Is there, for example, a
shared discourse about the value of competition that can provide both
communicative and political support for strategies to protect that pro-
cess? If there is no such discourse at present, can one be developed,
and what are the obstacles to, and costs of, doing so? Is there suffi-
cient political support among national, regional, and international ac-
tors to support a response? Are differences in the respective interests
of small and large states, developed and developing states, or various
regions of the world too great to permit effective arrangements re-
garding the protection of competition?
B. The Costs and Benefits of Response: Should Anything be Done?
The question of whether anything should be done raises other
issues. It involves analyzing costs and benefits, and here again we face
a situation in which there has been little systematic thinking. Yet the
effective assessment and comparison of costs and benefits presupposes
a framework to which these functions can be referred. On the domes-
tic level, such frameworks are established by factors such as the exist-
ence of a common currency, the conventions of a common budget,
and an authoritative political process. These do not exist on the inter-
national level (except perhaps in the most rudimentary of forms) and
without such a framework, assessing benefits and costs will necessarily
be haphazard, ad hoc, and of limited value.
The primary benefit of an international response will normally be
its effectiveness in reducing the potential harms to the process of
international competition discussed above. Evaluating its effective-
ness will depend, therefore, on the extent to which the underlying con-
ception of international competition adequately reflects influences on
transnational decision-making. As we have noted, this will include
19961
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
not only purely economic factors, but also factors such as the impact
of national governments on factor flows across their borders.
But what about assessing costs on the international level? Are
the benefits likely to be justified by the costs of achieving them? Ef-
fectively analyzing such costs requires reference to the resources,
broadly conceived, of the international "community," for the benefits
are intended to inure to that community, and any mechanism of im-
plementation will require the participation and cooperation of its
members. This requires, in turn, a concept of "system" which compre-
hends the relationships among the members of that community. This
would allow the "costs" of response to be framed in relation to their
impact on this system. Would a particular response, for example, de-
ter international investment? How might it intersect with the interna-
tional intellectual property rights regime? Will it interfere with
technological progress? Will it impede the participation of particular
types of states in other international cooperative arrangements?
These are some of the questions that will need to be related to each
other and to specific response initiatives.
III. FASHIONING AN INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
How then do we begin to fashion an international response?
What kinds of issues do we face? What criteria do we use in deter-
mining its shape and contents? What kinds of structures can we de-
velop for organizing thought about these issues? We can separate the
issues into two main categories. The first involves the content and
form of the norms themselves. Which conduct norms should be estab-
lished, and what form should they take? In shaping norms for this
objective, national competition law regimes furnish models, but, as we
have seen, protecting competition on the international level involves a
variety of issues that are not faced in the domestic context. It is likely,
therefore, that in order to be effective, international norms will have
to be crafted to address these specifically international factors.
A second set of issues involves the type of system that should be
developed for seeking compliance with these norms. Which institu-
tions should be involved and what methods should they be authorized
to use? If we look at national competition law systems, there are two
main models. In Europe and Japan, the central component of the sys-
tem is administrative decision-making, whereas in the United States,
private suits before regular courts play the central role. Neither of
these models in its current form is likely to be politically acceptable or
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effective at the international level. On that level, therefore, it will be
necessary to create compliance-inducing mechanisms with very differ-
ent characteristics that utilize some combination of national and inter-
national mechanisms in creative ways.
One criterion for evaluating-such mechanisms will be their likely
effectiveness in deterring the conduct deemed harmful. Given the
lack of generally effective enforcement mechanisms at the inter-
national level and the resulting need to rely to some extent on na-
tional institutions for compliance pressure, such responses are not
likely to be effective unless they reflect widely-held values and inter-
ests within the international community and thus can anticipate polit-
ical support from such national institutions.
A second major criterion will be the compatibility of such a sys-
tem with other interests and goals of the international community.
This will require thinking through the ways that international compe-
tition issues relate to issues such as the protection and encouragement
of international trade, the protection of intellectual property rights,
and the protection of the environment.
In recent years, two strategies have emerged for responding to
problems of protecting competition on the international level, and in
this Symposium we look at both. Our objective is to describe these
strategies themselves, as well as the forces that are shaping them and
some of their consequences, with particular reference to the relation-
ship between technological integration and the new intellectual prop-
erty rights regime.
The first of these strategies is increased and improved coopera-
tion between competition law authorities. In principle such coopera-
tion can hardly be faulted, but the issue is whether it provides an
adequate response to this specific problem. Judge Diane Wood exam-
ines what is perhaps the most developed form of such cooperation-
that between the United States and the European Union-and dis-
cusses its dynamics. As a high official in the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice during the early 1990s, Judge Wood played key roles in
developing this cooperation.
The second strategy involves what may loosely be called the har-
monization of competition laws. The most prominent example of this
strategy is the Draft International Antitrust Code ("DIAC" or "Mu-
nich Code"), which was recently developed by an international group
of scholars and which provides a basic framework of competition rules
and procedures for use internationally. Professor Wolfgang Fikent-
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scher is one of the leading figures in this group, and in this Sympo-
sium, he discusses the objectives and methods of the DIAC and
responds to criticisms of it.
CONCLUSIONS
I have sought in these introductory comments to adumbrate some
of the issues that may arise in developing an effective "competition
law" perspective on the expansion of intellectual property rights. A
central theme has been the importance of creating a perspective that
"sees" the specifically international characteristics of the situation
rather than merely projecting national thought and experience onto
the international level. I view it as part of a broader (and barely be-
gun) project of "internationalizing" the perspectives from which we
view issues of international economic integration and law's relation to
it.
The obstacles to fashioning such perspectives are many and high.
Not the least of them is the psychological inertia which resists the fun-
damental rethinking of both problems and solutions. Such resistance
is particularly difficult to overcome where it is neither perceived nor
acknowledged. Indeed, the temptation to treat issues of international
competition protection with the conceptual and institutional tools of
national competition law systems is attractive because it avoids the
need to recognize such obstacles. We hope that this Symposium will
heighten awareness of those obstacles and contribute to reducing
them. At the very least, experimenting with new conceptualizations,
perceptions, and potential solutions should help to reveal the need for
attention to the public policy issues in this area.
The task that the international community faces in developing
competition law perspectives on intellectual property rights, in partic-
ular, and on the process of globalization, in general, reminds me of a
somewhat analogous situation in Europe in the early decades of this
century. At that time, scholars in several European states began to
formulate ideas about how law might be used to protect the process of
competition. In order to develop such ideas and begin to secure their
acceptance, they had to develop a convincing conception of the pro-
cess of competition itself and an image of law's potential roles in pro-
tecting it.' This process took decades of intellectual and political
initiative and refinement, and only recently has it come to fruition in
1. 1 explore this development in detail in DAVID J. GERBER, PROTECTING PROMETHEUS:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETITION LAW IN EUROPE (forthcoming, 1997).
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the form of a conception of competition law that enjoys support
throughout Western Europe.
One lesson from that experience is that early conceptualizations
and perceptions can have exceptional durability, as subsequent
thought and practice tend to develop within and around these struc-
tures of thought and patterns of conduct. In Europe, conceptions of
competition law developed in response to the new and highly visible
problem of cartels, and competition law thought and practice in Eu-
rope continue to be heavily influenced by many conceptions that were
formed very early in this process of development. It may well be that
in developing conceptions of international competition law the phe-
nomenon of technological integration will play a role similar to that
played by cartels in the evolution of European competition law
thought.
